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What Will the Future Hold for the Independent Counsel
Statute?
A botched burglary attempt that occurred more than twenty-five
years ago has affected every presidential administration since that time.1
The attempted cover-up of the break-in at the Watergate building and
the affairs following what has come to be known as the Saturday Night
Massacre2 led to the enactment of the Ethics in Government Act of
1978,3 which included a provision creating the position of independent
counsel.' Since the statute went into effect, twenty independent counsels
have been appointed,5 and more than $136 million in public money has
been expended in the course of their efforts.6 As Professor Beth Nolan
has observed, "During the first eight years of the Act, until May 1986,
only four independent counsels were appointed.'" Currently, there are
1. On June 17, 1972, a group of burglars was apprehended breaking into Democratic Na-
tional Committee offices in the Watergate building in Washington, D.C. Thomas M. DeFrank
and Mark Mooney, with Dave Saltonstall, Watergate Legacy Enduring, DAILY NEWS (New York),
June 15, 1997, at 28.
2. Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel Process:
Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515, 1521 n.4 (1997). As
the investigation into the Watergate affair intensified, then-Attorney General Elliot Richardson
created the Office of Watergate Special Prosecutor under the authority of the Department of
Justice. As part of his investigation, the Watergate Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox, subpoe-
naed materials, including the infamous tapes, which were being held by President Richard
Nixon. When he learned of Cox's request, President Nixon directed Attorney General
Richardson to dismiss Cox. The Attorney General would not carry out the instruction and re-
signed. Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus followed suit when the President in-
structed him to fire the Watergate Special Prosecutor. Finally, Robert Bork, the Solicitor Gen-
eral and Acting Attorney General, fired Archibald Cox. Id.
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1998).
4. Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel Process:
Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, supra note 2, at 1521. The version of the act currently
in effect is the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108
Stat. 732 (1994).
5. Bill Miller, Counsels Have Spent $62 Million Investigating Administration, THE
WASHINGTON POST, October 1, 1998, at A21.
6. A.B. Stoddard, Congress Rethinks Independent Counsel Law, THE HILL, Feb. 11, 1998, at 1
(citing U.S. Rep. Jay Dickey (R-Ark.)). Spending information pertaining to outlays by inde-
pendent counsels are necessarily dated, because these figures are released only every six months
by the Government Accounting Office. Miller, supra note 5, at A21.
7. Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administration of Justice: Conflicts of Interest and
Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 GEO. L.J. 1, 18 (1990).
Duquesne Law Review
five ongoing inquiries.8
The framers of the Constitution of the United States made no provi-
sion for the office of the independent counsel or any similar position, al-
though they were keenly aware that there must be some check on the
powers of the President.' In the nearly two hundred years that preceded
the enactment of the statute, no fixed procedure existed by which the
President or other high-level executive officials could be investigated
and, if necessary, prosecuted." What has changed in our republic to have
made the independent counsel such a regular part of the political scene
in this era? Although the theories available to explain how we reached
the current state of politics and society are as numerous as the pundits
who espouse them, in the case of the independent counsel statute, the
explanation is likely a combination of politics and public perception.
To properly understand how and why the Ethics in Government Act
came to pass, it is necessary to recall its historical context." In 1978, the
American psyche was still badly bruised from the Watergate scandal. 2 At
the time, Congress determined that the citizens of the United States
should be given reason to comfortably believe that any allegation of mis-
conduct at the highest levels within the executive branch of the govern-
ment would be fully and objectively investigated.3 According to one
view, Congress believed that neither it nor the public could be assured
that officials within the Department of Justice would act in the sole inter-
est of justice in investigating certain matters involving administration
officials. 4 One result of this lack of confidence was the enactment of the
Ethics in Government Act. 5 Included within the Ethics in Government
8. Miller, supra note 5, at A21. Arlin M. Adams and Larry D. Thompson are investigating
issues concerning the Department of Housing and Urban Development during the Reagan ad-
ministration; Kenneth W. Starr is investigating the Whitewater and Monica Lewinsky matters;
Donald C. Smaltz is investigating Mike Espy; David Barrett is investigating Henry Cisneros; and
Carol Elder Bruce is investigating Bruce Babbitt. Id.
9. See generally, THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48 (James Madison).
10. Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel Process:
Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, supra note 2, at 1520.
11. Senator Carl Levin & Elise J. Bean, A Symposium on Special Prosecutions and the Role of the
Independent Counsel: The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter of Public Confidence and Constitu-
tional Balance, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (1987).
12. Id. at 13.
13. Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel Process:
Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, supra note 2, at 1521.
14. Nolan, supra note 7, at 10-11.
15. Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel Process:
Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, supra note 2, at 1521. During reauthorization debate, a
later Congress declared the following purpose for the act:
to ensure that a fair, impartial, and thorough investigation is conducted into all
criminal allegations against senior government officials; to ensure continuing
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Act is the independent counsel statute, which, by its terms, must be
reauthorized by Congress every five years. 6 The present version of the
independent counsel law will expire on June 30, 1999.1'
The Attorney General is responsible for enforcing the statute, which
applies to government officials in two categories. 8 The President and
Vice President, cabinet-level officials within the executive branch, 9 cer-
tain high-level executive staff offices, Assistant Attorneys General or
certain other high-ranking officials at the Justice Department, the Di-
rector and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, and the chairman and
treasurer of the President's political campaign committee all fall under
the first category.' When the Attorney General receives information
"sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate" whether an individual
within this category "may have violated any federal criminal law," she is
obligated to conduct a preliminary investigation.2 '
The second category under the independent counsel statute in-
cludes individuals regarding whom the Attorney General determines a
real or perceived conflict of interest may exist.22 A conflict of interest is
deemed to be present where a political, personal, or financial conflict
would result from an investigation or prosecution conducted by the Jus-
tice Department.23 In such cases, the Attorney General may, at her dis-
public confidence in our democratic system and to protect the Executive Branch
from unwarranted suspicion; to insulate the investigation suspicion; to insulate
the investigation of senior officials from personal or political influence and
therefore to ensure that its conclusion will have the fullest credibility; and to
afford protection to the reputation of any person subject to investigation, pre-
cisely because the independent counsel's investigation is independent and credi-
ble.
Nolan, supra note 7, at 15 (citing H.R. REP. No. 316, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 25, 11 (1987)).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1998); see also Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit,
The Independent Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, supra note 2, at 1521.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1998); see also Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit,
The Independent Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, supra note 2, at 1521.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) and (c) (1998).
19. The Cabinet consists of the secretaries of each of the departments within the executive
branch. The executive departments are the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense,
Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Interior,
Justice (in this case the attorney general), Labor, State, Transportation, Treasury, and Veterans
Affairs. OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1998/99, at 89.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1998). In total, seventy-five officials in the executive branch come
under the statute's provisions. Stoddard, supra note 6, at 1.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (1998). Note that this section provides an exception when the act
would be classified as an infraction or a class B or C misdemeanor. Id.




cretion, begin a preliminary investigation as to whether a request to ap-
point an independent counsel is appropriate.'
If the Attorney General launches such a preliminary investigation
into the possible violation of federal criminal law, that investigation must
comply with several significant restrictions.5 In conducting an investiga-
tion, the Attorney General may not use such common prosecutorial tools
as grand juries, subpoenas for material or testimony, grants of immunity
for witnesses, or plea bargains.26 Once the initial inquiry is complete, re-
lying on evidence gathered without the benefit of these devices, the At-
torney General must petition the special division of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 27 for the appointment of
an independent counsel, unless the Attorney General determines that
"there are no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is
warranted."' If the Attorney General determines that there are no rea-
sonable grounds to continue an investigation, she must notify the special
division of the court that she will not be seeking an independent counsel
and provide the court with a report describing the information made
available to the Justice Department and the findings of her
investigation.29 The Attorney General's decision not to seek the ap-
pointment of an independent counsel is not reviewable by the court
panel.3"
In cases involving individuals identified in the mandatory section of
the statute,3' if the findings of the investigation do not conclusively dem-
onstrate that there are no reasonable grounds to continue an investiga-
tion, the Attorney General must request that the court appoint an inde-
pendent counsel to investigate the matter.3 The special division will
then appoint an independent counsel and define the counsel's jurisdic-
24. Id. The Attorney General may also conduct a similar preliminary investigation of a
member of Congress if she determines such an investigation is "in the public interest." Id. at
§ 591(c) (2).
25. Id. at § 592(a) (2).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a) (2) (A) (1998).
27. Id. at § 592(c). The independent counsel-statute creates a separate section of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to appoint independent counsels, define
their jurisdiction and administer several other functions. Id. at § 593. The special division is
comprised of three judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, each of whom
serves for a term of two years. In the Matter of a Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39
F.3d 374, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1) (1998).
29. Id. at § 592 (b) (1) and (2).
30. Id. at § 592(b)(1).
31. Id.
32. Id. at § 591(c) (1).
Vol. 37:313
The Future of the Independent Counsel Statute
33tion.
Once appointed, an independent counsel has nearly all of the
authority possessed by the Attorney General and .can use a range of
prosecutorial tools to conduct a full investigation into the subject or indi-
vidual under investigation.34 The only limit on an independent counsel is
the extent of the jurisdiction granted by the court, and the only obliga.
tion of an independent counsel is to submit periodic reports concerning
the investigation.5 Provided the independent counsel follows these di-
rectives, it is virtually impossible to remove him from his position until
the investigation is completed.36
Congress carefully drafted the independent counsel statute to pro-
vide the independent counsel with the greatest degree of autonomy pcs-
sible, thereby hoping to avoid any attempt on the part of the chief ex-
ecutive to repeat the tactics employed by President Nixon when he felt
Archibald Cox's investigation was moving in a direction that was harmful
to his presidency.37 Such careful legislative drafting has also led to some
unanticipated consequences, as evidenced by the numerous amendments
made to the statute over its history.38 Even in its amended form, there
was insufficient support of the statute to muster the votes necessary to
renew the legislation in 1992.39 The statute was revived in 1994, largely
due to the strong support offered by a newly-elected President William J.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 593 (b)(1) (1998).
34. Id. at § 594(a).
35. An independent counsel may seek expansion of his jurisdiction when new information
has come to his attention which indicates the possibility of additional criminal activity. In this
case, the independent counsel must submit the information to the Attorney General who, after a
preliminary investigation, will determine whether a request to the special division of the court
for expanded jurisdiction is appropriate. Id. at § 593 (c) (2) (A) and (C). The independent coun-
sel is required to submit certain administrative reports to the court every six months and a final
report on the entire investigation at its conclusion. Id. at § 594(h) (1) (A) and (B). In addition,
the independent counsel is required to submit an annual report to Congress detailing the inves-
tigation to the extent necessary to explain the expenditure of funds (28 U.S.C. § 595 (a) (2)
(1998)) and to inform the House of Representatives of "substantial and credible information...
that may constitute grounds for an impeachment." In re: Brce Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony),
148 F.3d 1100, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994)).
36. The independent counsel may be removed by the Attorney General "only for good cause,
physical or mental disability ... or any other condition that substantially impairs the perform-
ance of such independent counsel's duties." 28 U.S.C. § 596 (a)(1) (1998). The independent
counsel may also be discharged by impeachment and conviction. Id.
37. Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel Process:
Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, supra note 2, at 1522 n.4.
38. The act was amended in 1983, 1984, 1987 and 1994. See, 28 U.S.C.A. § 591 (1993 and
Supp.1998).
39. The statute expired in 1992 as then-Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole used parliamen-
tary procedures to keep the legislation from being renewed. Amy Keller, After Reno's Decision,




The independent counsel statute sought both to assure the citizenry
that no one, including high government officials, was above the law and
to deter any wrongdoing by those at the top of the executive branch.!1 In
addition, the statute aimed to comply with traditional notions within the
legal profession regarding conflicts of interest."2 In terms of application,
the independent counsel statute involves all three segments of our na-
tional government. 3 The legislative, the executive and the judicial
branches, all play a role in the process, along with at least one private
attorney." As may be anticipated when legislation has such broad impact
on the operation of government and is the product of compromise, virtu-
ally every viewpoint finds fault with some aspect of the final product. The
independent counsel statute is a good example of such a piece of legish-
tion.
Until 1988, some of the statute's critics contended that the act was
simply unconstitutional. 5 The United States Supreme Court addressed
the constitutionality of the independent counsel statute in Morrison v.
Olson." Morrison dealt with an independent counsel's investigation of
Theodore Olson, a member of the Attorney General's office who alleg-
edly committed perjury when testifying before a congressional
committee.47 Mr. Olson first contended that the statute violated the Ap-
pointments Clause of the Constitution," which grants the President sole
authority to appoint principal officers of the United States. 9
The Court responded to this argument by categorizing the inde-
40. Susan Page, Independent Counsel Law: Parties Switch Sides But Both Say It May Be Time
For a Change, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 1997, at 4A. Five years later, President Clinton believes
that the independent counsel has allowed the criminal justice system to be used as a political
tool. Id.
41. Eric R. Glitzenstein & Alan B. Morrison, A Symposium on Morrison v. Olson: Addressing
the Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Statute: The Supreme Court's Decision in Morrison
v. Olson: A Common Sense Application of the Constitution to a Practical Problem, 38 AM. U. L.
REV. 359, 379 (1989).
42. Id.
43. Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel Process:
Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, supra note 2, at 1525.
44. Id.
45. The argument put forth by the executive branch in Morrison v. Olson was that the statute
violated Article II of the Constitution, which requires the executive branch to "take Care that
the Laws are faithfully executed." Eugene Gressman, A Symposium on Special Prosecutions and the
Role of the Independent Counsel: Introduction, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5 (1987).
46. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
47. John M. Kelly & Janet P. McEntee, Note, The Independent Counsel Law: Is There Life
After Death? 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 561, 572 (1993).
48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl 2.
49. Kelly & McEntee, supra note 47, at 572.
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pendent counsel as an inferior office, and as such, was a post that other
branches of the government could create and fill ° In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court noted that the independent counsel can, under some
circumstances, be removed by an executive official, the independent
counsel's duties and jurisdiction are limited by the statute, and the office
is not permanent.
51
Mr. Olson also contended that the independent counsel statute
violated the separation of powers doctrine.52 Here, the Court concluded
that the statute did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because
Congress was not seeking to enhance its own power by depriving the
President of authority over this executive branch officer 3
Following Morrison, there can be no doubt that the independent
counsel statute represents a valid constitutional exercise of congressional
authority.' However, the holding of the Supreme Court in Morrison has
not settled many of the other issues that have been raised with respect to
the law. In 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit hosted a judicial conference on the state of the current independent
counsel statute, at which attendees offered a variety of viewpoints."
Panel participants discussed issues that have arisen in the implementa-
tion of the statute in areas such as: (1) the manner of requesting the ap-
pointment of an independent counsel; (2) the appointment of an inde-
pendent counsel by the court; (3) the investigation by the independent
counsel; and (4) the role of congressional investigations covering the
same area as an independent counsel investigation
6
Although many commentators and legislators argue persuasively
that modifications should be made to various sections of the statute,
much of the consternation caused by the law stems from the procedure
set forth for the initial stage of an investigation 7 If cases lacking merit
could be removed from the process early on, many of the criticisms of the
50. Id. at 573 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72).
51. Id. (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72).
52. Id. at 574 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 704 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
53. Id. at 574-75 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686).
54. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696-97.
55. On Jfine 27, 1997, five separate panels discussed issues raised by the independent counsel
statute as part of the opening session for the circuit's 67th Judicial Conference. See Sixty.
seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel Process: Is It Broken
and How Should It Be Fixed?, supra note 2, at 1515.
56. See Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel
Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, supra note 2, at 1515.
57. See id. at 1528. Statements by former Justice Department official Jamie Gorelick suggest
that once the Attorney General initiates a preliminary investigation, "it is often difficult to
conclude that no further investigation is warranted." Id.
1999 319
Duquesne Law Review
statute could be substantially muted. Unfortunately, the terms of the cur-
rent statute obligate the Attorney General to seek an independent com-
sel in all but the most meritless cases."8
The process employed to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by a
person covered by the statute begins at the Department of Justice! 9 The
Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice has thirty days to determine whether the presented evidence
meets the specific and credible standard.' Upon the receipt of "specific
and credible evidence" regarding a covered person, the Public Integrity
Section begins an inquiry into the matter.6 According to Jamie Gorelick,
formerly with the Department of Justice, this is the stage of the process
where the statute's language has its most profound effect.62 This is so be-
cause the standard by which the Attorney General must decide whether
to seek an independent counsel is "whether further investigation is war-
ranted."63 Given this standard, cases that reach the preliminary investi-
gation stage often result in a request for the appointment of an indeperd-
ent counsel.
64
In discussing the standard imposed on Attorneys General, Former
Attorney General William Barr notes:
It is very hard to conceive of a case where you can make that call [that there
are no reasonable grounds to investigate further] where you haven't subpoe-
naed documents and you haven't brought witnesses before the grand jury, you
haven't compelled certain people to speak to you, especially when a lot of these
allegations have to do with lying.... So basically it creates a situation, a dy-
namic, under which it is virtually impossible, once information comes to you
about a covered person, to prevent the naming of an independent counsel be-
cause your hands are tied during the investigation phase ....
Such can be the case in situations where even compelling evidence of the
alleged behavior would not be sufficient to trigger prosecution by the Jus-
tice Department under normal circumstances.66
58. Id. at 1530 (statement by William P. Barr, a former United States Attorney General).
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 592 (1998).
60. Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel Process:




64. Id. The likelihood of an independent counsel appointment is amplified because the
statute prohibits the Attorney General from using many of the tools that are considered stan-
dard in a prosecutor's investigation. See 28 U.S.C. 592 (a) (2) (1998).
65. Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel Process:
Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, supra note 2, at 1530.
66. Id.
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The statute's requirement dealing with the question of intent, an
extremely important aspect of criminal law, further limits the Attorney
General's ability to use her own discretion.67 Here, although the burden
on a criminal prosecutor would be to establish intent beyond a reasonable
doubt, the statute requires the Attorney General to seek appointment of
an independent counsel unless she can establish a lack of intent by a
clear and convincing standard.6" Once credible evidence (or what is con-
ceivably credible evidence) that a crime may have been committed by a
covered person is brought to the attention of the Attorney General, it is
almost certain that an independent counsel will be appointed to invesi-
gate the allegations.69 Theodore Olson,7' formerly the subject of an inde-
pendent counsel investigation, suggests that, under the statute the situa-
tion is "almost like having to prove that you are innocent beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."'71 Although under some circumstances it may be appro-
priate to hold public officials to a higher standard, it is never appropriate
to prosecute such individuals under what is, in essence, a different law.
These issues and others have spawned efforts in both chambers of
Congress to alter the independent counsel statute. Republicans, who as a
party generally oppose the independent counsel statute, have received
some newfound support from their colleagues on the other side of the
aisle, particularly in response to Kenneth Starr's investigation of Presi-
dent Clinton." Representative James Clyburn, a Democrat who voted to
renew the statute in 1994, is now on record as being opposed to the
law.7" The minority counsel for the House Judiciary Committee, David
67. Id. at 1531.
68. Id. at 1531-32.
69. Rep. Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, has stated that "mere
allegations, assertions, rumor or hearsay" can begin a process that culminates with the appoint-
ment of an independent counsel and the undertaking of an investigation with all of the author.
ity and resources provided to the independent counsel by the statute. Scott Shepard, Investiga-
tions ...or Politics?: Many Believe Changes Overdue in Lengthy, Wide-ranging, Costly Probes,
ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Apr. 13, 1996, at A10.
70. Theodore Olson was investigated for allegations that he committed perjury before the
House Judiciary Committee while he was employed in the Attorney General's Office at the
Department of Justice. When an independent counsel was appointed to investigate the allega-
tions, Mr. Olson, brought suit, claiming that the independent counsel statute was unconstitu-
tional. Mr. Olson ultimately lost this argument when the U.S. Supreme Court, in Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), declared that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Kelly &
McEntee, supra note 47, at 572.
71. Shepard, supra note 69, at A10.
72. Stoddard, supra note 6, at 1. In August of 1994, Kenneth Starr began his investigation
into President Clinton's involvement in the Whitewater real estate deal. Shepard, supra note
69, at A10.
73. Stoddard, supra note 6, at 1. Rep. James Clyburn (a Democrat from South Carolina) now
says of his 1994 vote, "I still regret it and will never vote for it again. I think that's a bad law. I
1999
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Yassky, contends, "Nobody feels the [independent counsel] law, as it is
currently structured, works." 4 Even Senator Carl Levin, one of the stat-
ute's past champions, has offered an extensive plan to revamp the law! 5
In February 1998, the prevailing view on Capitol Hill was that any
debate on the merits of modifying or terminating the independent coun-
sel law should wait until the Starr investigation had been completed. 6
Senator Fred Thompson, Chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee, stated that the committee would hold hearings regarding the
statute and its future." Senator Thompson himself seemed pessimistic
concerning the renewal of the independent counsel statute? Consider-
ing that Kenneth Starr has indicated that his report to Congress is not
the end of his investigation, 9 Congress may be forced to publicly debate
the matter this year while an investigation of the President is still ong)-
ing. That possibility is growing more likely as both the Senator Thomp-
son's Governmental Affairs Committee and the House Judiciary Coma-
mittee have begun hearings regarding the possible re-authorization of the
statute."0 With the Starr investigation continuing beyond the Senate
don't know of anybody who can survive an independent prosecutor." Id.
74. John Anderson, Fifteen Months and Counting: The Clock is Running Out on the Independent
Counsel Law, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Apr. 1998, at 58.
75. Id. Senator Levin's proposal calls for: (1) limiting the jurisdiction given to independent
counsels; (2) limiting the applicability of the law to allegations of crimes committed either while
in federal office or as a candidate for such an office; (3) limiting the budget for each independ-
ent counsel investigation; (4) reducing the number of federal officials to whom the statute ap-
plies; (5) raising the evidence of criminal wrongdoing threshold that triggers the appointment of
an independent counsel; and (6) granting the Attorney General the authority to determine if an
independent counsel should serve full-time in the office. Id.
76. Stoddard, supra note 6, at 1.
77. Amy Keller, The Last Starr Fighter? Abuse of Authority Controversy Could Spell the End of
the Independent Counsel Statute, ROLL CALL, Mar. 2, 1998, at 10. Senator Thompson has ex-
pressed his own concerns about the application of the current law being different than the stat-
ute's original intent. On July 22, 1998, Senator Thompson reiterated his personal concerns
about the statute to reporters and suggested that Congress earnestly consider eliminating the
independent counsel law. Jack Torry, End of Independent Counsels? PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, July 23, 1998, at A6. Senator Thompson's counterpart in the House of Representa-
tives, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee Henry Hyde, also voiced concern about the
law. Congressman Hyde said of the current version of the statute that "mere allegations, asser-
tions, rumor or hearsay" can be enough to invoke the law and appoint an independent counsel
to investigate. Shepard, supra note 69, at A10.
78. James Toedtman, The Impeachment Trial / Another Probe Victim / Law Creating Special
Prosecutors Expected to Die, NEWSDAY (New York), Jan. 13, 1999, at A5. Addressing Attorney
General Janet Reno's decision not to seek an independent counsel to investigate fundraising
associated with President Clinton's campaign, Senator Thompson stated, "This is probably the
final nail in the coffin of the independent counsel law."
79. Kevin McCoy, No Stop Signal for Bill Probe, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Sept. 11, 1998, at
37.
80. Penny Bender, Lawmakers Debate Reforming, Killing Independent Counsel Act Gannett
1999 The Future of the Independent Counsel Statute
impeachment trial of President Clinton, several legislators seem content
to simply allow the law to lapse."' Even supporters of the statute ac-
knowledge that the current political climate and the controversy sur-
rounding Kenneth Starr's investigation "could very well be the beginning
of the end for the independent counsel law.' 2
Members of Congress introduced seven separate bills during the
105th Congress to modify some aspect of the law.83 Representative Rob-
ert Wexler introduced perhaps the most noteworthy and far-reaching of
these bills.84 The Wexler bill proposed: (1) granting the Attorney Gen-
eral subpoena power for preliminary investigations; (2) further limiting
News Service, Mar. 8, 1999.
81. Judy Keen, Time to Move On, Lawmakers on Both Sides Say, USA TODAY, Feb. 15, 1999,
at All.
82. Amy Keller, supra note 77. Senator Carl Levin, who has long supported the statute, has,
himself, noted that the independent counsel process has become "hopelessly politicized." Id.
Similarly, Stephen Saltzburg, who chairs the Independent Counsel Act Task Force for the
American Bar Association, has stated, "[tihe statute invites political influence and political
game-playing all the time." Id. Mr. Saltzburg continued by noting, "[mjy sense is that most
members of the task force would vote to abolish the statute if they could." Id.
83. S. 581 would place a limit on the number of years a judge could serve on the special
division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which appoints the
independent counsels and would also require that regulations be created regarding the proce-
dures for such appointments by the special division. S. 581, 105th Cong. (1997). S. 2075 would
establish a process for expedited review of claims of executive privilege during an independent
counsel investigation. S. 2075, 105th Cong. (1998). S. 1065 would include the alleged viola-
tion of various election laws by covered persons as a trigger for a preliminary investigation by the
Attorney General and would also provide, under some circumstances, that Congress could peti-
tion the court for appointment of an independent counsel. S. 1065, 105th Cong. (1997). H.R.
117 would limit those allegations in response to which the Attorney General is required to con-
duct an initial investigations to charges of federal felonies or federal misdemeanors committed
while in office. This bill would also change the standard used by the Attorney General in de-
termining lack of intent from clear and convincing evidence to a preponderance of the evidence.
The bill also provides for several other modifications to the statute. H.R. 117, 105th Cong.
(1997). H.R. 139 would allow the Attorney General to issue subpoenas as part of a preliminary
investigation. H.R. 139, 105th Cong. (1997). In addition, the bill would limit funding for office
expenditures to two years, unless re-authorized by Congress and prohibit an independent coun-
sel from engaging in other legal work while the investigation is ongoing. Id. H.R. 692 would
expand those individuals covered by the statute to include employees of the Justice Department.
H.R. 692, 105th Cong. (1997). H.R. 3464 would grant the Attorney General subpoena power
for preliminary investigations, reduce those executive offices to which the statute applies, limit
the alleged crimes which can trigger an investigation, modify the standard for requesting the
appointment of an independent counsel from the current reasonable grounds to "substantial
grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted," establish a two-year term (renewable
under certain circumstances) for independent counsels and prohibit independent counsels from
engaging in other employment during their investigation. H.R. 3464, 105th Cong. (1998).
84. Congressman Wexler is a Democrat from Florida serving his first term. He is also a
member of the House Judiciary Committee. The bill offered by Congressman Wexler has been
designated H.R. 3464.
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the executive offices to which the statute applies; (3) limiting the alleged
crimes that can trigger an investigation; (4) modifying the standard for
requesting the appointment of an independent counsel from the current
reasonable grounds to "substantial grounds to believe that further inves-
tigation is warranted"; (5) establishing a two-year term (renewable under
certain circumstances) for an independent counsel; and, (6) prohibiting
an independent counsel from engaging in other employment during an
investigation.
8 5
Congressman Wexler's bill proposed comprehensive revisions to the
independent counsel statute attempted to rectify most of the major issues
that have been identified as problematic within the legal and political
communities.86 However, the bill will not be re-introduced this year be-
cause "Congressman Wexler is concerned about the excesses of the in-
dependent counsel and likely will vote against reauthorization." 7 One
issue that was not addressed by the Wexler bill is the costs incurred for
investigations by independent counsels, an issue often highlighted by the
media and periodically by members of Congress.8 As noted above, recent
figures place the total cost of independent counsel investigations over the
life of the statute at $136 million and climbing.89 Although this is cer-
tainly a significant sum of money, it seems less extraordinary when com-
pared to outlays for other federal government activities. For example, the
1998 appropriation for the Department of Justice approved by Congress
was$17.5 billion.9' Moreover, when compared with other issues raised by
the independent counsel statute, the expenditures made by independent
counsels in the course of their investigations could, perhaps, be justified if
the statute was accomplishing its goals.
What should be a major issue in the minds of legislators as they
wrestle with the question of whether to renew the statute, renew it with
modifications, or abandon it completely is whether the law is having its
intended effect. According to a statement issued by Senator Carl Levin
when the act's renewal was being considered in 1987, the statute "re-
stores public confidence in our criminal justice system[,] . . . and it fur-
thers the Framers' goal of instilling appropriate checks and balances
85. See H.R. 3464. There were ten co-sponsors of the bill. Id.
86. See generally, Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent
Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, supra note 2.
87. Telephone Interview with Eric Johnson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Congressman Robert
Wexler Uan. 22, 1999).
88. See, e.g., Shepard, supra note 69, at A10.
89. Stoddard, supra note 6, at I (citing Rep. Jay Dickey).
90. 1998 Federal Spending Bills; Commerce-Justice-State Bills Cleared, FACTS ON FILE WORLD
NEWS DIGEST, Nov. 20, 1997, at 844 A3.
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within the federal government."' The Ethics in Government Act of
1978, which includes the independent counsel statute, was enacted with
the aim of rehabilitating citizens' faith in political officials and the federal
government.92 Has that faith been rekindled? In a 1997 poll, forty-five
percent of those surveyed viewed the independent counsel law as "a good
thing," while seven percent viewed the statute as "a bad thing."'3 How-
ever, it is worth noting that the same poll found that almost fifty percent
of the respondents did not know enough about the law to form an opin-
ion.94 A year later, a December 1998 survey suggested a higher level of
public support with eighty-two percent of poll respondents indicating
that they believed the independent counsel statute should be retained;
however, a majority thought the law needed modification?'
A similar survey of professionals who would, as a group, be more
familiar with the legal aspects of the statute revealed a different perspec-
tive. A 1998 poll of lawyers conducted for the National Law Journal re-
vealed that twenty-seven percent of the attorneys responding believed
the independent counsel statute should be allowed to expire? 6 Sixty per-
cent of the survey respondents thought the law should be amended to
limit the scope of independent counsel investigations?7 Only eight per-
cent of the attorneys surveyed believed that the statute should be reen-
acted in its current form.9"
At this point, the independent counsel statute is viewed, by both
91. Senator Carl Levin with Elise J. Bean, A Symposium on Special Prosecutions and the Role of
the Independent Counsel: The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter of Public Confidence and Con-
stitutional Balance, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 22 (1987).
92. Kelly & McEntee, supra note 47, at 566 n.13.
93. These findings are taken from a USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll conducted Oct. 27-29,
1997 which was calculated to have a three percent margin of error. Susan Page, Independent
Counsel Law: Parties Switch Sides But Both Say It May Be Time For a Change, USA TODAY, Nov.
14, 1997, at 4A.
94. Id.
95. Richard Willing, Independent Counsel May Become Extinct, USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 1999, at
7A.
96. Marcia Coyle & Harvey Berkman, Bar to Starr: Clinton Lied, But So What, THE
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, June 29, 1998, at Al. A national survey of 406 lawyers (114 Demo-
crats, 139 Republicans and 153 Independents) found that lawyers were divided on their views
regarding the independent counsel statute. Id. The poll asked, "Which of the following state-
ments comes closest to your point of view with regard to the independent counsel law?" Id. The
responses were as follows: the law should be renewed in its present form after it expires, 8%;
after the law expires, it should not be renewed, 27%; the law should be modified to ensure
counsels remain more focused on their original mandate, 60%; and, not sure, 5%. Id. The poll
was conducted by Mason-Dixon Political/Media Research and had a five percent margin of





legislators and the public, as just another political tool that the party not
in control of the White House can employ to discredit the President for a
political advantage.' As noted by Professor Julie O'Sullivan:
[0] ne of the 'lessons' of the operation of the [independent counsel] statute ...
is that in cases of potentially great political import it creates partisan incentives
to generate the very 'appearance' problems that the statute sought to erase. As
a consequence, although the [independent counsel] mechanism in general may
enjoy public support, the political dynamics of the statute mean that in the
high-profile cases at the heart of the statute partisans will seek to destroy that
which the statute is designed to further: public confidence in the integrity of
the results of the independent investigation.
100
In the most important cases, the same reasons offered for why a particular
charge or accusation is "too politically charged" to allow the Justice De-
partment to handle the investigation virtually assure that the conclusions
of any independent counsel will be challenged by those with differing
political motivations.0 In its current form and application, the inde-
pendent counsel statute has had the unintended effect of diminishing
public confidence in the independent, nonpartisan nature of justice
meted out by the federal government. 2 Ultimately, laws are designed to
protect society. When a law no longer serves this purpose, but rather
damages the general perception of the society, that law should be abd-
ished.
Archibald Cox, the former Watergate Special Prosecutor, has noted,
"[tWhe pressures, the tensions of divided loyalty are too much for any
man, and as honorable and conscientious as an individual might be, the
public could never feel entirely easy about the vigor and thoroughness
with which the investigation was pursued. Some outside person-is abso-
lutely essential."'0 3 The point is well taken, but abolition of the independ-
99. David Jackson, White House Keeping Heat on Starr for Inquiry Tactics; Polls Show Low
Public Opinion of Investigation, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 19, 1998, at Al. A March
17, 1998, CBS poll found that only thirty-one percent of those responding believed Kenneth
Starr's investigation of President Clinton to be "impartial" compared to fifty-eight percent who
found Mr. Starr's behavior to be "partisan." Another CBS poll, taken in May of 1998, found that
fifty-two percent of those surveyed considered Mr. Starr's inquiry to be partisan. Elaine Sciolino,
Softening the Image of Kenneth Starr, THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 25, 1998, at Al.
100. Julie O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 463, 464 (1996).
101. Id. at 474.
102. Anderson, supra note 74, at 15; Rethink Independent Counsels, THE DESERT NEWS (Salt
Lake City, UT), Apr. 16, 1998, at A14.
103. Eugene Gressman, A Symposium on Special Prosecutions and the Role of the Independent
Counsel: Introduction, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3 (1987), (citing Removing Politics From the Ad-
ministration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the Subcommittee on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 200 (1974)).
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ent counsel would by no means free the President and other high-ranking
government officials from accountability for their actions or from the
appointment of special prosecutors from outside of the Department of
Justice. As Professor O'Sullivan"° suggests, career prosecutors within the
Justice Department are certainly competent to pursue allegations against
government officials in most cases."0 5 If conflict of interest is an issue in a
particular situation, the Attorney General may appoint a private attorney
to serve as a special prosecutor."m Such special prosecutors were em-
ployed by Attorneys General to investigate Watergate,"7 the Whitewater
land transactions,"'°and several other allegations."° There is even some
evidence to suggest that a special prosecutor appointed by the Attorney
General is equally likely to fulfill the expectations of the public and the
criminal justice system as is an independent counsel."0 Professor
O'Sullivan acknowledges that dealing with allegations against high gov-
ernment officials in this manner does not provide a statutory guarantee
that the President will not dismiss a special prosecutor who is on the
verge of seriously damaging the administration, but she contends the
public uproar which would accompany any such executive maneuver
would ensure that justice is ultimately served."'
As illustrated by the Watergate scandal, Congress also has the
authority to investigate alleged wrongdoing by executive branch officials;
104. Professor O'Sullivan is a member of the faculty at Georgetown University Law Center
and is viewed as the preeminent "theoretical critic" of the independent counsel law. She also
served on the staffs of special prosecutor Robert Fiske and independent counsel Kenneth Starr.
Anderson, supra note 74, at 15.
105. Anderson, supra note 74, at 15. Professor O'Sullivan contends that the statute provides
an independent counsel "an excess of time, means and incentive to pursue a far greater number
of people, over a wider investigatory landscape, with less justification, and at greater human,
financial and institutional cost than is reasonably necessary to promote the reality, or appear-
ance, of evenhanded justice." Id.
106. Id.
107. Archibald Cox served as the special prosecutor for the Watergate investigation involving
President Nixon. Id.
108. Robert Fiske, Jr. was appointed as a special prosecutor to investigate land transactions
involving President Clinton and Mrs. Clinton, Id.
109. Former Attorney General William Barr arranged for people outside of the executive
branch to investigate allegations that raised conflict of interest issues or those that were par-
ticularly sensitive in a political sense. Sixty-seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit,
The Independent Counsel Process, Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, supra note 2, at 1532-
33. Former Attorney General Griffin Bell appointed Paul J. Curren as "special counsel" to in-
vestigate possible criminal conduct on the part of President Jimmy Carter and his brother Billy.
O'Sullivan, supra note 100, at 506.
110. O'Sullivan, supra note 100, at 505 (citing Katy J. Harriger, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE
FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 38 (1992)).
111. Anderson, supra note 74, at 15.
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although, given the often partisan nature of the inquiries, the findings of
such investigations may be open to question."' However, the Watergate
Committee stands as an example of how partisanship can be successfully
checked during a congressional investigation.' Whether by appoint-
ment of a special prosecutor by the Attorney General or the initiation of
a congressional investigation, mechanisms currently exist, separate from
the independent counsel statute, to investigate possible misconduct by
officials within the executive branch of the national government.
In short, our democracy is not so fragile that a President would ever
be able to stymie an investigation into serious allegations of wrongdoing
on his part or on the part of others within the administration. Given the
current state of politics, it seems unfathomable that members of Congress
would allow criminal charges against the President or another member of
the executive branch to be shelved absent anything less than a full and
thorough investigation.
As part of his dissenting opinion in Morison, Justice Scalia observed
that it would be extremely difficult for a member of Congress to vote
against something called the Ethics in Government Act."4 Although
Justice Scalia's observation may be an accurate assessment of the nature
of politics, it may be considerably easier for a legislator to simply not vote
at all and allow the independent counsel law to lapse. Such inaction
would ultimately be in the best interest of the nation. As noble as was the
intent for creating the office of the independent counsel, the unintended
consequences of the statute far outweigh any benefit it may offer today.
Joseph E. Haviland
112. O'Sullivan, supra note 100, at 470.
113. Id.
114. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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